



THE JOINT STAFF

Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900060007-2
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

J2DM-77-60
3 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: U.S. Position Paper for Standing Group Intelligence Estimate for NATO Planning 1960 through 1966 (SG 161/13)

Enclosure: J.C.S. Changes to Subject Paper

1. Yesterday the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the United States Position Paper for the Standing Group Intelligence Estimate for NATO Planning 1960 through 1966 (SG 161/13). I am enclosing a copy of the changes to which they agreed.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the changes will result in a NATO paper more applicable to the planning it is designed to support.

3. Under the terms of the "Agreed Procedures" I have been designated to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff in presenting the above changes to you. I am also greatly concerned about the need for expeditious final resolution of this problem in view of the fact that the Standing Group Conference commences on 7 March 1960. I recommend your concurrence in the changes made.

4. If you agree with the changes as being appropriate to a Standing Group intelligence estimate, I would appreciate your concurrence so that this paper may be released as soon as possible.

Done
gr
Robert A. Brettweiser
ROBERT A. BRETTWEISER
Major General, USAF
Director for Intelligence

JCS and DIA
review(s) completed.

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E N C L O S U R E

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CHANGES TO THE UNITED STATES
POSITION PAPER FOR STANDING GROUP INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
FOR NATO PLANNING 1960 THROUGH 1966 (SG 161/13)

1. Page 38, paragraph 3, beginning at the top of page 38, change as follows:

"a general war without itself incurring unacceptable damage we do not believe that the Soviets will ~~attempt to build~~ during the period of this estimate, rely solely on an ICBM force ~~designed for this purpose~~ to achieve their objectives in general war. Nevertheless, they will probably build a substantial long-range missile force. They will almost certainly wish to have a high degree of deterrence, and beyond this, ~~should deterrence fail~~, a force offering as much promise of success for an attack, ~~a pre-emptive attack~~, or indeed ~~for a retaliatory attack~~ as can be brought within acceptable margins of economic costs. Also, and again consistent with acceptable cost, the Soviets will probably build up their planned force rapidly in order to capitalize ~~through political exploitation~~ on their lead over the West in missile development; through political exploitation or potential use."

2. Page 40, paragraph 9, change as follows:

"Provided that NATO maintains a posture of effective deterrence, Wwe believe the Soviet leaders will not select the course of deliberate initiation of general war during the

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Enclosure to TS 172590
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period of this Estimate. They show full appreciation of the incalculable disaster that would be visited upon both sides in such a war. Their programs to build greater military power, however, are being pushed vigorously. ~~But-they-probably~~
~~do-not-count-upon-acquiring-by-any-particular-date-an-advantage~~
~~so-decisive-as-to-permit-them-to-launch-general-war-with~~
~~assurance-of-success-and-under-conditions-which-would-not~~
~~gravely-menace-their-regime-and-society."~~

3. Page 54, paragraph 24, third sentence, change the third sentence to read as follows:

"It is estimated therefore that a Soviet decision to initiate ~~a limited~~ military operations war in the NATO Area is highly unlikely during the period of this Estimate so long as the foregoing two key factors of Soviet judgment remain unchanged."

